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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SOCIAL MEDIA: HOW MANDATORY
ARBITRATION CLAUSES IMPACT SOCIAL NETWORKING
Kelsey L. Swaim*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Instagram, initially created by Kevin Systrom and Mike Krieger in October 2010,
and later acquired by Facebook in September 2012, has become a leading social media
network for sharing photos on the Internet.1 Over the course of Instagram’s brief history,
the social networking service has logged over 100 million active users. 2 The Instagram
application allows Android and iPhone users to add filters and other effects to their photo
before posting them on the Instagram site itself, as well as other social networking sites
including Facebook and Twitter.3
On December 17, 2012, Instagram announced the release of updated Terms of
Use (“Terms” or “Instagram’s Terms”), effective January 16, 2013.4 These updated
Terms indicated Instagram reserved the right to sell its users’ photos to third parties for
use in advertising without providing the user with notification or compensation.5 After
substantial public backlash and a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, Instagram revised the new provision regarding
advertising by deleting the language about “displaying photos without compensation”;
however, Instagram maintained the provision allowing it to place users’ photos in
advertisements.6 In addition to the provision regarding advertising, the updated Terms
included a mandatory arbitration clause forcing users to resolve any disputes with
Instagram through “binding, individual arbitration.”7
Following in the footsteps of eHarmony and Pinterest, Instagram’s mandatory
arbitration clause provides that any dispute between a user and Instagram “will be
resolved by binding, individual arbitration under the American Arbitration Association’s
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See Instagram, FAQ, http://instagram.com/about/faq (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
2
See id.
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See Instagram, Privacy and Terms of Service Changes on Instagram (Dec. 17, 2012),
http://blog.instagram.com/post/38143346554/privacy-and-terms-of-service-changes-on-instagram (last
visited Mar. 11, 2013).
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See Jenna Wortham & Nick Bilton, What Instagram’s New Terms of Service Mean for You, N.Y.
TIMES BLOG, (Dec. 17, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/what-instagrams-new-terms-ofservice-mean-for-you/?smid=tw-nytimes (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
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Dan Levine, Instagram Furor Triggers First Class Action Lawsuit, Yahoo! Finance (Dec. 24, 2012),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/instagram-furor-triggers-first-class-181048764.html (last visited Mar. 11,
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Systrom addressed the public concern that Instagram was going to sell users’ photos without compensation
by stating “it is not our intention to sell your photos. We are working on updated language in the terms to
make sure this is clear.”
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Instagram, Terms of Use, http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/updated (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
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rules for arbitration of consumer-related disputes.”8 As such, Instagram users waive any
right to resolve disputes before a jury, except for the three categories of disputes which
users are able to opt-out of arbitration.9 Additionally, the arbitration clause contains a
class action waiver, prohibiting users from participating in “class action or class-wide
arbitration” regarding any disputes.10
While the imposition of a mandatory arbitration clause in Instagram’s Terms did
not create the public upheaval that the advertising provision created, the future impact of
this mandatory arbitration clause could be monumental on the furtherance of social
networking. Unlike the advertising provision, users have likely not fully grasped the
long-term impact of Instagram’s mandatory arbitration clause because of the recent social
media trend toward mandatory arbitration and the relatively young age of most social
media users. The average user, simply by registering for an account with social
networking services, signs away his or her right to a jury trial, and often his or her right to
engage in class action litigation, without fully understanding the consequences.11
This article will analyze Instagram’s updated Terms of Use, discuss the
implications of imposing mandatory arbitration upon Instagram users, and compare the
terms of several other social media and social networking services employing similar
mandatory arbitration provisions. Specifically, Part II will discuss the plain language of
the mandatory arbitration clause found in Instagram’s Terms. Part II will also address the
mandatory arbitration clauses included in the terms and conditions of other popular social
media and social networking sites. Part III will address the rise of mandatory consumer
arbitration, as well as the classification of social media users as consumers. Finally, Part
IV will examine the implications, both positive and negative, of Instagram’s mandatory
arbitration clause.
II. MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN SOCIAL MEDIA
A growing number of social networking and social media sites are incorporating
mandatory arbitration clauses into their terms of service, particularly following the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in AT&T Mobility12 and Greenwood,13 which amplified
the trend for a broad enforcement of consumer arbitration agreements.14 Instagram
joined the trend by releasing updated Terms in December 2012, effective January 19,
8

Id.
See id. Instagram allows users to opt-out of arbitration for disputes relating to intellectual property,
violation of Instagram’s application programming interfaces terms of use, or violations of Instagram’s
Basic Terms concerning transmission of viruses.
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Id.
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See Michael L. Rustad, et al., An Empirical Study of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in
Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 643 (2012).
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See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). In AT&T Mobility, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of class action waivers in consumer adhesive arbitration contracts, holding void
the California public policy which invalidated arbitration agreements containing class action waivers. In
espousing this holding, the Supreme Court re-emphasized the federal policy favoring arbitration,
particularly in the consumer context.
13
See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). As part of its holding in Greenwood,
the Supreme Court stated the Federal Arbitration Act required enforcement of the arbitration agreement’s
terms contained in the credit card application.
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See Rustad, supra note 11.
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2013, which contained a mandatory arbitration provision.15 Two of the most popular
social networking sites, Facebook16 and Twitter,17 do not establish a mandatory
arbitration clause in their terms; however the terms of other social media sites, including
Pinterest18 and LinkedIn,19 and online dating websites, including eHarmony20 and
Match.com,21 do contain mandatory arbitration provisions. In addition to the text of
Instagram’s arbitration clause, the texts of the arbitration clauses contained in the terms
of Pinterest, eHarmony, Match.com, and LinkedIn are examined below.
A. Instagram’s Terms of Use
As of January 19, 2013, Instagram users became bound by updated Terms22 which
significantly expanded the previous Terms of Use.23 While many of the terms and
conditions were expounded upon in the updated Terms, the most significant provision
added to the updated Terms is an arbitration clause.24 Users who choose to review
Instagram’s Terms are first given notice of the arbitration clause in the introductory
paragraph. Conspicuously set out by its bolded and capitalized text, this arbitration
notice states:
Arbitration Notice: Except if you opt-out and except for certain types of
disputes described in the arbitration section below, you agree that disputes
between you and Instagram will be resolved by binding, individual
arbitration and you waive your right to participate in a class action lawsuit
or class-wide arbitration.25
The arbitration clause itself, however, is a significantly longer text contained near
the end of the Terms. Set off by a bolded “Arbitration” heading, the arbitration clause
states Instagram users “agree that all disputes between you and Instagram . . . will be
resolved by binding, individual arbitration under the American Arbitration Association’s
rules for arbitration of consumer-related disputes and you and Instagram hereby expressly
waive trial by jury.”26 The clause also provides that users may opt-out of arbitration for
disputes relating to intellectual property (including trademarks, trade dress, domain
15

See Instagram, Terms of Use, http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
See Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, http://www.facebook.com/legal/ terms (last
visited Mar. 11, 2013).
17
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See Pinterest, Terms of Service, http://pinterest.com/about/terms (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
19
See LinkedIn Corp., User Agreement, http://www.linkedin.com/static?key=user_agreement (last
visited Mar. 11, 2013).
20
See eHarmony, Inc., Terms of Service, http://www.eharmony.com/about/terms (last visited Mar. 11,
2013).
21
See Match.com, L.L.C., Terms of Use Agreement, http://www.match.com/registration/
membagr.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
22
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names, trade secrets, copyrights, and patents), violations of Instagram’s application
programming interface (“API”) terms, or violations of Basic Terms 13 or 15 concerning
the transmission of viruses.27 As an alternative to the mandatory arbitration provision,
Instagram allows users to bring a claim in a “small claims” court if permitted by the small
claims court’s rules.28
In addition to the mandatory aspect of the arbitration clause, a second important
aspect concerns the prohibition of class arbitration. Consistent with the Supreme Court
decision in AT&T Mobility,29 Instagram’s arbitration clause incorporates a class action
waiver that requires all users to bring claims against Instagram in his or her individual
capacity.30 Pursuant to the class action provision, users are not permitted to participate in
a class action lawsuit or class-wide arbitration proceeding instituted against Instagram.31
Additionally, users are not permitted to participate in claims brought against Instagram
by a private attorney general.32
Regarding the logistical aspects, the arbitration clause provides that the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”)33 will govern dispute resolution.34 Furthermore, any arbitration
proceedings will be administered according the rules established by the American
Arbitration Association (“AAA”).35 In the event the AAA is unable or unwilling to hear
the claim, Instagram reserves the right to elect to have the proceeding administered by the
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”).36
B. Pinterest Terms of Service
Pinterest users may be surprised to discover the Pinterest Terms of Service
(“Pinterest Terms”) contain an arbitration clause because users must scroll to the end of
the Terms to discover the clause.37 Pinterest’s Terms state that users must first contact
Pinterest and attempt to informally resolve any dispute that may arise. 38 If informal
dispute resolution is unsuccessful, users agree to resolve “any claim, dispute, or
controversy . . . by binding arbitration.”39 By agreeing to arbitrate disputes, users also
agree to waive his or her right to a trial by jury.40 The binding arbitration proceedings
27

Id. In order to opt-out of arbitration, a user must notify Instagram, in writing, within thirty days of
first becoming subjected to the arbitration provision. Therefore, individuals using Instagram prior to the
January 19, 2013, arbitration clause implementation were required to notify Instagram of their desire to optout by February 18, 2013. Users joining Instagram subsequent to the January 19, 2013, implementation
must notify Instagram of their desire to opt-out within thirty days of opening their account.
28
See id.
29
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
30
See Instagram, supra note 15.
31
See id.
32
See id.
33
See The United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 883, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)
[hereinafter the “Federal Arbitration Act” or “FAA”].
34
See Instagram, supra note 15.
35
See id.
36
See id.
37
See Pinterest, supra note 18.
38
See id.
39
Id.
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See id.
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will be administered according to the AAA’s rules.41 Additionally, Pinterest’s arbitration
clause includes a class action waiver, which prohibits users from participating as a
member in a class or representative proceeding and mandates users to bring individual
claims in the instance of a dispute.42
Pinterest’s arbitration clause also addresses several logistical aspects of bringing a
claim, including forum and costs. The arbitration clause states that the arbitration
proceeding will be conducted in the county of the claimant’s residence, unless the parties
agree otherwise.43 Regarding costs, the provision states each party will be responsible for
paying the AAA filing fee, administrative fee, and arbitrator fees;44 however, Pinterest
agrees to cover these costs if the claim is not frivolous and does not exceed $75,000.45
C. eHarmony Terms of Service
Like Instagram and Pinterest, the popular online dating site, eHarmony, also
subjects users to a mandatory arbitration provision.46 In the introductory paragraph of
eHarmony’s Terms of Service (“eHarmony Terms”), a bolded sentence informs users that
an arbitration provision is contained in Section 15.47 However, this introductory
paragraph does not provide an overview of the arbitration clause; rather it advises users to
see the provision in Section 15 to be informed of their rights.48
The Section 15 arbitration provision is divided into five specific paragraphs –
Arbitration of Disputes, No Class Actions, Arbitration Procedure, Enforcement, and
Limitation of Time Period to Commence a Dispute.49 In the first paragraph, eHarmony
informs users that “any dispute . . . will be subject to FINAL AND BINDING
ARBITRATION,” and the dispute will be governed by the FAA.50 Users are also
intentionally informed that agreeing to arbitrate means both eHarmony and its users are
waiving their right to pursue a judicial action before either a judge or a jury. 51
Furthermore, eHarmony reserves the right to choose to resolve intellectual property
disputes in a forum other than arbitration.52
In the second paragraph, eHarmony employs a class action waiver, and informs
users that disputes must be brought individually. 53 Identical to Instagram’s Terms,
eHarmony prohibits users from participating in a class action or other proceeding
regarding another party’s dispute.54 Additionally, eHarmony prohibits users from
41

See id.
See Pinterest, supra note 18.
43
See id.
44
See id.
45
See id. The clause states the claim’s frivolousness will be determined pursuant to the standard set
forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
46
See eHarmony, supra note 20.
47
See id.
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See id.
49
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50
Id. (emphasis in original).
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engaging in class arbitration or any other arbitration proceeding brought by a
representative.55 The third paragraph informs users that if a resolution to the dispute
cannot be reached through informal means, the arbitration proceeding will be
administered by the AAA.56 The fifth and final paragraph provides for a one-year
window from the date of the incident in order to file an arbitration claim against
eHarmony.57 If a user fails to file a claim within the one-year window, the user has
waived his or her right to pursue a claim.58
In addition to the arbitration clause, the third paragraph contains a hyperlink
directing users to view supplementary information regarding the arbitration procedures.59
The procedures establish additional details not contained in the arbitration clause,
including the means for submitting a claim, selecting an arbitrator, conducting discovery,
and paying for the arbitration proceeding.60 Unlike Instagram’s Terms or Pinterest’s
Terms, the additional procedural information provided by eHarmony allows users to be
fully apprised of the process and the nuances of filing a claim with the AAA.
D.

Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement

A mandatory and binding arbitration provision is contained in paragraph twentythree of Match.com’s Terms of Use Agreement (“Match.com’s Terms”).61 Similar to
Pinterest’s Terms, Match.com does not notify users of this arbitration provision in the
introductory paragraph, and therefore users must scroll to the end of the terms to become
aware of the arbitration agreement.62 Subsection (a) of the arbitration provision informs
users that “the exclusive means of resolving any dispute or claim . . . shall be BINDING
ARBITRATION.”63 Subsection (b) allows notifies users that the mandatory arbitration
provision indicates a waiver of the users’ right to a jury trial. 64 Users are, however,
permitted to take matters to a small claims court.65 Regardless of whether Match.com
users choose arbitration or a small claims court, the arbitration provision specifically
prohibits users from commencing or participating in a class action, class-wide arbitration,
or any other representative proceeding.66 Regarding the logistics, subsection (a) states
the arbitration proceeding will be administered by the AAA. 67 Subsection (d) states the
arbitration agreement shall be governed by the FAA and that the dispute shall be
governed according to the laws of the state of Texas.68
55

See id.
See eHarmony, supra note 20.
57
See id.
58
See id.
59
See eHarmony, Inc., Arbitration Procedures, http://www.eharmony.com/about/terms/ arbitration
(last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
60
See id.
61
See Match.com, supra note 21.
62
See id.
63
See id. (emphasis in original).
64
See id.
65
See id.
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67
See id.
68
See id.
56

361

E. LinkedIn’s User Agreement
Unlike the typical mandatory arbitration provisions included in the terms of
Instagram, Pinterest, eHarmony, or Match.com, the LinkedIn User Agreement dispute
resolution clause accommodates both legal disputes and arbitration proceedings.69
Contained in Section 8 of LinkedIn’s User Agreement (“LinkedIn Terms”), users are
presented with a paragraph describing the law for legal disputes and a paragraph
describing the option for arbitration.70 The primary dispute resolution provision for
LinkedIn users is by “a state or federal court located in Santa Clara County, California.”71
However, as laid out in the second paragraph of Section 8, users may opt to resolve
disputes through arbitration for “any claim where the total amount of the award sought is
less than $10,000.”72 Where a claimant is able to pursue arbitration, the dispute will be
resolved “in a cost-effective manner through binding, non-appearance-based
arbitration.”73
The arbitration option does not provide any specifics regarding the proceeding
itself, but it does state that arbitration will be administered by a mutually agreed upon
established alternative dispute resolution provider.74 The clause does however provide
three criteria with which the chosen alternative dispute resolution provider must comply,
including (1) “the arbitration shall be conducted by telephone, online and/or be solely
based on written submissions,” (2) “the arbitration shall not involve any personal
appearance by the parties or witnesses,” and (3) “any judgment or award rendered by the
arbitrator shall be final and may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction.”75
III. SOCIAL MEDIA USERS AS CONSUMERS
A. The Rise of Mandatory Arbitration for Consumers
Mandatory arbitration in consumer transactions is a contractual provision
whereby the company requires consumers “to agree to submit any dispute that may arise
to binding arbitration.”76 Arbitration is “mandatory” in the sense that the Supreme Court
has interpreted the FAA to empower lower courts to strictly enforce arbitration clauses by
compelling parties to arbitrate disputes, even if one party wishes to litigate. 77 Mandatory
arbitration agreements have become common in nearly every facet of a consumer’s daily
69

See LinkedIn, supra note 19.
See id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
See LinkedIn, supra note 19.
75
Id.
76
Joshua T. Mandelbaum, Stuck in a Bind: Can the Arbitration Fairness Act Solve the Problems of
Mandatory Binding Arbitration in the Consumer Context?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1079 (2009).
77
See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (stating that Congress declared a “national policy favoring
arbitration” in enacting FAA Section 2); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1 (1983) (stating that Section 2 of the FAA is “a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements”).
70
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life as these adhesive clauses are generally included in vehicle and home loan documents,
credit card terms, gym memberships, and cell phone contracts.78 With the recent surge in
social media sites mandating arbitration of disputes between users and the provider,
mandatory arbitration encompasses the entire gamut of consumers. Despite the current
overwhelming popularity with mandatory arbitration, the appeal of mandatory arbitration
in consumer transactions is a relatively new phenomenon.79
One of the first cases addressing arbitration in the consumer context arose in the
Seventh Circuit in the late 1990s.80 In Hill, the plaintiff-consumers purchased a computer
from the defendant-manufacturer over the telephone.81 Upon shipment, the defendantmanufacturer placed terms and conditions in the box, one of which included an
arbitration clause.82 In the plaintiff-consumers’ suit for breach of contract and warranty,
the court ruled the adhesive nature of the terms did not alter the validity of the arbitration
clause.83
A number of cases following Hill challenged the unilateral imposition of
arbitration most commonly associated with consumer arbitration.84 The main stumbling
block in perfecting mandatory arbitration in consumer transactions rested on many
courts’ concern that the arbitration clause’s adhesive nature did not adequately represent
the weaker party’s interests.85 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T
Mobility, upholding class action waivers contained in an arbitration clause, not only
enforced the federal policy favoring arbitration, but also impliedly enforced adhesive
contracts utilized in consumer transactions.86 In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia
78

See Miles B. Farmer, Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121 YALE
L.J. 2346 (2012); Mandelbaum, supra note 76.
79
See Mandelbaum, supra note 76, at 1081.
80
See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
81
See id.
82
See id.
83
See id.
84
See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that the
adhesive arbitration clause itself was not unenforceable, but the requirement that the arbitration proceeding
take place in Chicago under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce was substantively
unconscionable); Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (holding that the
arbitration agreement was not per se unconscionable, but the evidence supported a finding that the health
maintenance organization had fraudulently induced participants to agree to arbitrate disputes); Armendariz
v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (holding that a nonmutual requirement that
employees arbitrate wrongful termination claims was substantively unconscionable); Kloss v. Edward D.
Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002) (holding that the arbitration clauses in question were contracts of
adhesion).
85
See, e.g., Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(holding the arbitration provision procedurally unconscionable because the arbitration clause was overly
harsh and one-sided in favor of the seller); Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2005) (holding the arbitration provision was procedurally unconscionable because the defendant, who
was in a much superior bargaining position, mailed the terms to the plaintiff on a “take it or leave it” basis);
Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1177-81 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding the arbitration
provision procedurally unconscionable in light of various factors illustrating “a huge disparity in bargaining
power”); Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
ITT’s arbitration contract was unenforceable because the adhesive contract was imposed and drafted by the
“party of superior bargaining strength,” leaving the weaker party “only the opportunity to adhere to the
contract or reject it”).
86
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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addressed the nature of consumer transactions, particularly the historical practice of
conducting business through adhesion.87 As such, Justice Scalia indicated that since
society has traditionally embraced the use of adhesive contracts in consumer transactions,
the court was not in a position to disregard that historical practice.88 Specifically, the
Supreme Court stated adhesive consumer contracts, even adhesive consumer contracts
containing an arbitration clause, were valid, irrevocable, and enforceable contracts
pursuant to FAA § 2.89
B. “Consumer” Defined
A consumer is conventionally defined as “a person who buys goods or services
for personal, family, or household use.”90 Modern day commerce is most typically
defined by the use of standard-form contracting.91 In the typical transaction for a good or
service, the business presents a standard-form contract to the consumer at the time of
purchase.92 Regardless of whether the consumer actually read the standard-form contract
or understood the terms contained therein, they are generally bound by its terms.93 As
discussed above, a common practice among many businesses has been to include
mandatory arbitration clauses in these standard-form contracts, requiring that any dispute
between the business and consumer be settled through final and binding arbitration.94
While social media users are not actively signing a paper contract to utilize the
services of these websites, users gain access to social media sites by agreeing to the terms
of a license agreement.95 To create an account with a social media site, users must agree
to two click-wrap agreements96: (1) a terms of use license and (2) a privacy policy.97
However, social media sites frequently allow users to agree to these terms by simply
checking a box on the sign-up page without actually reviewing the text of the terms.98
Most often individuals agree to the terms of social media sites, including the mandatory
arbitration clause, without any awareness of the terms’ ramifications or consequences.
As a result of the process for creating a profile and accepting the social media provider’s
terms, the user has essentially become a consumer of the website’s features.99
87

See id.
See id.
89
See id.
90
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
91
See Aaron Chiu, Irrationality Bound: Terms of Use Licenses and the Breakdown of Consumer
Rationality in the Market for Social Network Sites, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 170 (2011).
92
See id. The standard-form contract can either be presented face-to-face or electronically. Regardless
of whether the contract is presented in paper form or electronically, courts have upheld the validity and
enforceability of such contracts.
93
See id.
94
See Mandelbaum, supra note 76, at 1079.
95
See id. at 175.
96
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). A click-wrap agreement, also referred to as a “pointand-click agreement,” is an electronic shrink-wrap license whereby “a computer user agrees to the terms of
an electronically displayed agreement by pointing the cursor to a particular location on the screen and then
clicking.”
97
See Chiu, supra note 91, at 195.
98
See id. at 201.
99
See id.
88
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Although social media websites are traditionally lumped into the category of
electronic commerce, the characteristics differ greatly from typical web-based services.100
Social media websites are most commonly utilized as an online platform for the
disclosure of personal information with friends.101 After creating a profile, users are able
to communicate with friends through the posting of bulletins and private messaging.102
Users are wholly responsible for the management of their profiles;103 the social media
website simply provides the platform for users’ disbursement of information.104
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN SOCIAL MEDIA
With over ninety million active monthly users, Instagram’s new mandatory
arbitration clause has the potential to pose significant and widespread implications.105
Although the general benefits of arbitrating, as opposed to litigating, a dispute have aided
the growth of arbitration as a viable dispute resolution mechanism, these benefits do not
easily transfer into the context of mandatory arbitration of consumer-related disputes. In
fact, it is arguable that the adhesive nature of consumer arbitration, particularly involving
social media, has caused the negative consequences to outweigh the benefits.
A. Positive Implications
Arbitration has become a more popular form of dispute resolution based on its
touted benefits – efficiency, lower costs, informality, and finality.106 Of these benefits,
individuals are most commonly attracted to arbitration because the parties are able to
reach a much quicker resolution to their dispute.107 The speed at which disputes are
resolved also serves to reduce the amount of legal expenses.108 The efficiency and
associated cost of arbitration proceedings is especially valuable when the claim being
disputed is for a small sum of money.109 Plaintiffs that would not otherwise be able to
bring a small claim against a business in court are empowered by the lessened expense to
bring such a claim through arbitration.110 Not only are results rendered rather quickly,
but also the finality of the arbitral award spares parties from enduring a lengthy and
costly appeals process.111

100

See id.
See id.
102
See Chiu, supra note 91, at 201.
103
See id.
104
See id.
105
See Instagram, Instagram in Statistics (Jan. 17, 2013), http://instagram.com/ press (last visited Mar.
11, 2013); Matthew Lynley, Now We Know How Many Active Users Instagram Really Has, WALL ST. J.
BLOG (Jan. 17, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/ 01/17/now-we-know-how-many-active-usersinstagram-really-has (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
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See Mandelbaum, supra note 76, at 1081.
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See id.
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110
See id. at 2353-54.
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However, these benefits are frequently questioned when arbitration is unilaterally
imposed upon consumers.112 Nevertheless, these benefits still accrue in the social media
context, but more often than not these benefits tend to be one-sided in favor of the social
media provider.113 By imposing a mandatory arbitration clause in its terms, social media
providers are able to choose the decision-maker and control the nature of the
proceeding.114 Four of the five arbitration provisions examined above indicate that the
AAA would administer the arbitration proceeding.115 Instagram’s Terms also indicated
that in the event the AAA was unable to administer the arbitration proceeding, the
proceeding would be administered according to JAMS rules. 116 By indicating that either
the AAA or JAMS would administer the proceeding, these social media providers are
able to ensure that any arbitration proceeding will be run efficiently and in a costeffective manner. Furthermore, by prescribing the use of the AAA, the social media
provider also has the benefit of familiarity with the steps and rules of arbitration.117
In contrast to the typical consumer mandatory arbitration clause, Instagram’s
Terms and LinkedIn’s Terms provide users an exception to the mandatory arbitration
requirement that actually benefits the user. Instagram’s Terms grants users an alternative
to arbitration if they wish to bring their claim in a “small claims” court. 118 The small
claims alternative stems from the AAA’s Consumer Due Process Protocol (“AAA
Protocol”), which provides that a fair consumer arbitration agreement should “make it
clear that all parties retain the right to seek relief in a small claims court for disputes or
claims within the scope of its jurisdiction.”119 Instagram’s Terms and the AAA Protocol
both recognize that claims involving small amounts of money are better suited for
resolution by small claims courts.120 As such, Instagram users wishing to bring a small
monetary claim against Instagram maintain the option to litigate the claim in a convenient
and expeditious judicial forum.
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LinkedIn’s Terms also differ from the typical consumer mandatory arbitration
clause by providing users the ability to choose between litigation and arbitration.121
Pursuant to LinkedIn’s Terms, the party seeking relief has the option to arbitrate any
dispute if the claim is less than $10,000.122 LinkedIn’s Terms also mandates that the
arbitration proceeding will be conducted either by “telephone, online, or solely through
written submission.”123 Compared to the option to litigate, which requires users to
resolve their dispute in the “state or federal court located in Santa Clara County,
California,” the arbitration option favors the user because the user can arbitrate his or her
dispute with LinkedIn from home.124 Therefore, LinkedIn’s arbitration option may
actually be the most cost efficient method for dispute resolution because of the nominal
travel costs coupled with the traditional arbitration cost advantages.
B. Negative Implications
Mandatory arbitration clauses have become prevalent in consumer transactions,
and now social media user agreements, partly because of the associated benefits for the
imposing party. The consumers themselves, however, seldom experience the positive
aspects of arbitrating disputes because the adhesive nature of consumer arbitration
prevents the weaker party from bargaining for favorable provisions.125 In fact, because of
the unique characteristics of social media compared to other forms of commerce, the
negative implications of mandatory arbitration are exaggerated when imposed upon
social media users.
Choosing to arbitrate a dispute rather than litigate exemplifies the traditionally
accepted principle of freedom of contract.126 Yet, when a business imposes the
requirement to arbitrate any dispute on the consumer, freedom of contract has been
evaded and the consumer becomes the victim of unequal bargaining power.127 The
resulting social concern about mandatory arbitration is that the consumer will be unable
to obtain a fair resolution to their dispute because of the layers of protection the business
maintains by controlling the arbitration proceeding.128 An Instagram (or other social
media) user unhappy with the term’s new arbitration clause have only one guaranteed
remedy – delete his or her account.129 As a result of the mandatory arbitration clause,
users have automatically agreed to arbitrate any dispute that arises simply by sharing a
photo or accessing Instagram’s mobile application. The consequences are the same for
users any of the other social media sites discussed above. Mandatory arbitration
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provisions in social media terms wholly evade the user’s right to bargain for favorable
terms because the only alternative is to cease use of the service.130
Even though mandatory arbitration clauses strip users of the ability to structure
the arbitration proceeding in a favorable manner, the ease and informality of arbitrating a
dispute has caused arbitration to be referred to as the court for the average citizen.131
Social media users, however, are frequently unaware that social media websites include
arbitration provisions in their terms.132 Most users are not required to actually view the
site’s terms in order to accept the terms and create an account.133 Even if users were
required to view the terms, social media providers often are not required to make the
arbitration notice conspicuous.134 Only two of the five arbitration provisions analyzed
above – Instagram and eHarmony – provide users with a notice of the arbitration clause
in the introductory paragraph.135 Users of the other three services – Pinterest,
Match.com, and LinkedIn – must scroll to the end of the respective terms in order to learn
their disputes must be arbitrated.136 Regardless of the conspicuousness of the arbitration
notice, the onus is on users to familiarize themselves with the terms when creating a
social media account to avoid later surprise by the requirement to arbitrate when a dispute
arises.
The average age of social media users increases the negative implications of
imposing mandatory arbitration upon users. A recent study conducted by the Pew
Internet & American Life Project analyzed the demographics of social media users,
specifically including Instagram users.137 According to the study, thirteen percent of
internet users utilize Instagram’s picture-sharing service.138 Instagram users are more
commonly female than male, and more commonly African-American or Hispanic than
Caucasian.139 Additionally, an overwhelming percentage of users are between the ages of
eighteen (18) and twenty-nine (29), with a substantial number of users between the ages
of thirty (30) and forty-nine (49).140 Probably the most important statistic is that the
majority of Instagram users are college-age or younger, because, even where users are
aware the arbitration clause exists, younger users may not understand the intricacies of
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the terms.141 A user’s inability to fully comprehend the terms leaves the user unable to
accurately assess the risk of agreeing to arbitrate any dispute.142 Despite the naivety of
the majority of social media users, the greatest consequence of mandatory arbitration is
that the arbitration provision will be enforced regardless of the user’s sophistication or
understanding of the implications.143
V. CONCLUSION
In January 2013, Instagram, following in the footsteps of Pinterest, Linked In,
eHarmony, Match.com, and other social networking websites, implemented a mandatory
arbitration provision into their Terms. Under this arbitration provision, users are required
to submit any dispute against Instagram to final and binding arbitration. The
consequences associated with imposing mandatory arbitration upon social media users
highly outweigh the benefits. The greatest consequence is that each and every user,
regardless of age or sophistication, is automatically required to arbitrate all disputes
simply by creating an account. A user may not understand the implication of agreeing to
arbitrate at the time they create their account, which accentuates the problem of
mandatory arbitration. Although users do not anticipate having to arbitrate disputes when
creating social media accounts, users need to begin considering those risks because once
the terms are agreed upon arbitration is inevitable.
The five arbitration clauses analyzed in Part II, supra, are only a small assortment
of the arbitration clauses actually in place. The number of social media websites utilizing
mandatory arbitration clauses is larger than the number that do not, and it is only a matter
of time before the remaining providers update their terms to include a mandatory
arbitration clause. Currently the two most popular social media websites, Facebook and
Twitter, do not have mandatory arbitration provisions in their terms. However, since
Facebook purchased Instagram for one billion dollars in April 2012,144 it is reasonably
foreseeable that Facebook will update their Terms to include a mandatory arbitration
clause once the success of Instagram’s mandatory arbitration clause is assessed.
From a user perspective, the best advice is to become aware of the terms and
conditions established by each social media website. Like the Instagram Terms and
LinkedIn Terms, many social media arbitration clauses do not reflect the typical adhesive
consumer arbitration clause. As such, users may have the option to opt-out of arbitration
for certain claims, but users must be familiar with the terms and act timely to avoid
arbitration. Despite the lack of consideration, using social media has transformed into a
comparable practice to purchasing other goods or services. Social media users cannot
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take these services lightly because the lack of choice to resolve a potential dispute has
greater implications than chatting with friends would suggest.
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